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4.1  Introduction 
In  a recent paper, Dornbusch and Edwards (1989) established a stylized 
outline of  the macroeconomics of  populism. They showed that the experi- 
ences of  Chile under Allende and Peru under Alan Garcia are very similar and 
consistent with features they consider characteristic of populist governments 
and policies. The purpose of my contribution is to reconsider that description 
to see if  it also applies to the Argentine experience between 1973 and 1976 
and to evaluate and understand both the possible motivations for such policies 
and their long-run implications. 
During those years Argentina underwent an important economic policy ex- 
periment. At  the same time the country was in the midst of  strong political 
violence and social conflict. Violence had began around 1968 and had origi- 
nated as the consequence of guerrilla activities. Among the guerrilla groups, 
the most prominent were the Montoneros, which initially worked from within 
the Peronist party, and the ERP (Ejkrcito Revolucionario del Pueblo).' In the 
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1.  The sociology of the guerrilla movement is extremely complex. Montoneros belonged ini- 
tially to intellectual groups educated in a violent nationalistic tradition. Afterward it combined a 
wide spectrum of ideological lines among which right-and left-wing nationalism, Marxism, Trot- 
skyism, certain versions of Peronism, and the ideology embedded in the theory of  dependency 
and liberation theology  were all components. Montoneros had  a strategy of  selective attacks, 
murders, and kidnappings. It was predominantly an urban movement. The ERP, founded in 1971, 
had  initially a Trostkyist and later a Guevarist orientation. They tried to carry on an open war 
against the government for which they made themselves strong in the north of the country. They 
were both an urban and rural movement (see, e.g.,  Floria and Garcia Belsunce 1988; David Rock 
1987). 
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early seventies, political violence escalated as extreme right-wing groups re- 
sorted to explicit violence as well.  Among these, the most well known was 
the Triple A (AAA or Alianza Anticomunista Argentina), which was also later 
proved  to have been commanded by chief Peronist party members.  As vio- 
lence gained the streets, the citizenry began to perceive the struggle not only 
as an ideological  war but also as an internal struggle for power among the 
leaders of  the ruling party. This, among other things, undermined the confi- 
dence in the democratic system and helped substantially in generating a con- 
sensus for the military coup of 1976. 
Four different  Presidents-Htctor  Campora, Raul Lastiri, Juan Doming0 
Peron, and Isabel Peron-held  office between 1973 and 1976. The first, who 
came from the most left-wing groups of the party, had the support of guerrilla 
organizations and left-wing intellectuals. The second, Raul Lastiri, belonged 
to the right-wing factions of the Peronist party. Peron supported a more am- 
biguous middle-of-the-road  position,  trying to maintain  good relations with 
all the groups that constituted his movement. His strong personality  and his- 
torical authority allowed him to control internal struggles or at least to keep 
them in a silent and hidden  second place.  Finally, Isabel Peron favored the 
right-wing factions, but her weak personality generated, while president,  an 
open explosion of internal struggles of which she quickly lost control. 
Surprisingly,  especially considering the diversity of personalities that held 
the presidency between  1973 and 1976, the initial economic policy was main- 
tained unchanged through all of them. Only during the government of  Isabel 
Peron did the situation deteriorate to the point that corrections could not be 
avoided. The initial stability of the economic policies was due to the strong 
backstage influence of Peron, who imposed on Cgmpora a minister of finance 
of his own choosing. During this period, JosC Ber Gelbard held office without 
interruption throughout the presidencies of Campora, Lastiri, Peron, and Isa- 
bel Peron. 
But before reviewing the political events of the period and studying in more 
detail the implementation and evolution of economic policies,  it is useful to 
briefly describe the main facts regarding populist policies and experiences as 
summarized in Dornbusch and Edwards (1989). 
According to Dornbusch and Edwards (1989), the populist program arises 
as a reaction to a period of slow growth or recession, which has usually oc- 
curred under the patronage of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and/or 
conservative governments at home. 
The populist paradigm explicitly rejects conservative thought by dismissing 
the idea of  resource constraints.  Unemployed  labor and idle capital capacity 
is seen as proof  of  lack of demand  and the need of  expansionary  policies. 
Existing reserves provide room for a loosening of foreign restrictions, over- 
valuation of the exchange rate, and therefore for an increase in real wages. 
Demand expansion is not considered to be inflationary. Increasing returns to 
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sion with price stability. Higher real wages feed back by expanding demand 
and therefore  generating efficiency gains, which allow reductions  in prices, 
increased competitiveness, and efficiency. This improves the balance of  pay- 
ments, increases investment and output, which in turn initiates another round 
of the virtuous cycle. 
Dornbusch and Edwards consider, then, that the policy prescription of  pop- 
ulist programs is very simple: “reactivation with redistribution,” which is to 
be achieved by wage increases,  price controls, increased spending, overval- 
uation of  the exchange rate, and the restructuring  of production  to generate 
higher savings and higher growth. 
The macroeconomics of populism  can be separated into two main topics. 
The first relates to the properties of the real equilibrium of the economy.  In 
this respect it is assumed that the economy can do much better. The rhetoric 
has old-fashioned Keynesian tones and calls for strong expansion of  govern- 
ment spending. Loose monetary policy is advocated on credit-rationing argu- 
ments. Even though these arguments may be outdated, the theoretical issue of 
multiple  real  equilibria remains an important one in  the macro literature. 
Search models (Diamond 1982) and increasing-returns-to-scale models (Mur- 
phy, Vishny, and Shleifer 1989) support a similar view. The old price-rigidity 
arguments can be replaced by those of multiple equilibria, coordination fail- 
ure, or thin and thick externalities, to give a neoclassical theoretical support 
to the possible  long-run success of expansionary policies.  It is necessary to 
note, nevertheless, that populist regimes were all but neoclassical. As will be 
shown below in the analysis of the Three Year Plan of the Peronist party it was 
accepted and believed that market forces should be strongly modified and reo- 
riented in order to achieve improved social outcomes. 
The second topic is that of  macroeconomic adjustment. Here populist poli- 
cies call for strongly heterodox programs: price and exchange controls with a 
freezing of  wages and of public tariffs. Inflation is not viewed as a monetary 
phenomenon  but as a consequence of income struggle. As noted previously, 
demand expansion  is  not  consider  inflationary,  so  that  the  basic  strategy 
should concentrate on arranging an agreement between main economic inter- 
est groups so that income struggle stops. Theoretical  work on this topic has 
been less developed.2 
As will be seen below, the Argentine experience shows that heterodox sta- 
bilization policies, while by themselves insufficient to reduce inflation in the 
long run, may be extremely useful initially in the transition to a lower inflation 
rate. On the other hand, no support is given to the idea of multiple equilibria. 
The attempt to expand output was unsuccessful in the end. 
According to Dombusch and Edwards (1989), populist programs evolve in 
four phases.  First,  an  initially  successful  stabilization  is  accompanied  by 
2. See Dornbusch and Simonsen (1987) for a review, or Bruno et al. (1988) for a review of 
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strong output expansion. In the second phase, problems begin to emerge as a 
result of the overheating of the economy and increased pressure on bottleneck 
sectors. Lack of foreign exchange begins to be a complication for the Central 
Bank. The third phase presents an acute worsening of problems, explosion of 
inflation, crisis in the balance of payments, capital flight, and an increase in 
the budget deficit. The government then tries to stabilize and adjust the econ- 
omy, devalues the currency,  reduces  subsidies,  and increases public tariffs. 
Real wages begin to fall. The end comes with an orthodox stabilization pro- 
gram, with wages falling below the initial level due to capital flight, a higher 
real  exchange rate, and  a shift of  political  power against labor unions and 
lower income classes. 
As a brief  summary it can be said that, for the Argentine experience be- 
tween 1973 and 1976, it is not true that initial conditions featured a recession 
previous to the implementation of the program. In the postwar period and until 
the early eighties, Argentina’s  historic growth rate was of about 4% a year 
(Brodersohn  1973). The military  had been  in power  since  1966 with GNP 
increasing by 0.6% in 1966, 2.7% in 1967,4.3% in 1968, 8.5% in 1969, and 
5.4% in  1970. In  1971 and 1972 growth of total GNP was 4.6% and 3.1%, 
respectively. The first half of  1973 was strongly expansionary with a growth 
rate of 6.1% in the first quarter and of 6.3% in the second. 
The initial phase, implemented through the Acta de Concertucidn (Concer- 
tation  Act) by Minister of Finance Ber Gelbard was extremely successful in 
achieving even higher growth, complete price stabilization, progressive redis- 
tribution of income, and an increase in the reserves held by the Central Bank. 
After a year, the results of the program had been so spectacular that even those 
most strongly opposed to the government had to give credit to the economic 
policy being  implemented.  Among these,  Roberto Alemann,  a well-known 
conservative said:3 
The economic policy implemented last May has in its favor the fact that it 
tries to stop inflation  suddenly.  In  order to do that,  it  attacked  simulta- 
neously several factors: it froze and reduced prices, raised taxes, [and] fixed 
wages,  markups, and other related  measures. The immediate result was a 
halt in the increase of the cost of living. Annual inflation of 70% stopped, 
the stock market bounded upward, the black market exchange rate dropped, 
and tax collection increased.  The country watches surprised [at] these re- 
sults  that  nobody  would  have  imagined  before  the  twenty-fifth  of  May, 
maybe not even the authors of the policy. (Chin,  12 August 1973) 
After a year and a half problems began to emerge. The price freeze caught 
many producers with low real prices, and shortages appeared in different sec- 
tors. On the other hand, monetary  and fiscal policies continued  to be  very 
permissive.  The terms of  trade began to move  against the country, quickly 
worsening the external-sector  situation.  This eventually led to a shift in the 
3. All of the following newspaper quotations were obtained from Di Tella (1977). 81  Description of  a Populist Experience: Argentina 
cabinet, which placed Gomez Morales, considered a more orthodox econo- 
mist,  as minister  of  finance.  During  his  administration,  problems went  on 
accumulating,  and even though some flexibility was introduced in the control 
of prices and wages,  serious corrections  of  the economy’s imbalances were 
avoided. 
Following Dornbusch  and Edwards  (1989),  the third  phase  arrives when 
problems become so intense that the government decides to make an adjust- 
ment of the economy. In June 1975, an acute crisis in the balance of payments 
precipitated  that readjustment.  It was carried on by  the new minister of  fi- 
nance: Celestino Rodrigo,  member of the right-wing faction of the Peronist 
party, which was now in control of the government. (Isabel Peron was already 
president and Jose Lopez Rega, minister of social welfare and chief of AAA, 
had  accumulated  considerable  power.)  Real wages  fell, inflation  exploded, 
and a recession ensued. This lead to a quick discreditation of the right-wing 
group, which was therefore neutralized from the government. 
After the Rodrigo experiment, center-left members of the party temporarily 
gained some power, and even occupied the office of the presidency for a short 
period. Isabel Peron, claiming medical reasons, asked for a temporary leave. 
Italo Luder,  head of  the senate and member of the center-left  coalition,  was 
provisionally sworn in as president. Antonio Cafiero, who had the confidence 
of the unions and the moderate groups of the Peronist party, became minister 
of finance. He implemented a gradualist strategy for reducing rampant infla- 
tion and maintained expansionary demand policies to avoid increasing unem- 
ployment. 
In January  1976, President Isabel Peron engineered a comeback, displacing 
the  more moderate  groups and imposing  tougher adjustment  measures.  By 
then though, the end of the regime was in clear sight. Phase 4 in Dornbusch 
and  Edwards’s  characterization  finally  took  place after March  1976 with a 
military coup and the implementation of strict orthodox policies. 
After this brief summary it is clear that Dornbusch and Edwards’s descrip- 
tion of the evolution of populist programs fits reasonably well the Argentine 
experience  between  1973 and  1976.  If  any  differences  should  be  distin- 
guished, it would be that the adjustment phase appears to have been extremely 
long, alternating back and forth between shock and gradualist policies.  The 
end was characterized by social unrest, political violence carried to its height, 
a fall in real wages, an increase in inflation, and a discreditation of the politi- 
cal parties and the democratic system in general. 
As Guido Di Tella (1983) has put it: “The military coup met no opposition, 
and  with  it ended the two and a half  years of Argentina’s  second populist 
experience. It had indeed been an unhappy one” (p. 83). 
4.2  The Political Environment 
The Peronist party came to existence and consolidation with the advent of 
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had participated in a nationalist coup d’etat, holding the office of Secretary of 
National Labor where he came to popularity and gained the love of Argenti- 
na’s working class. Peron was elected president in 1946. His first six years in 
power were characterized by  aggressive demand policies, industrial protec- 
tion, import substitution, a hostile attitude toward foreign capital, progressive 
labor legislation, and a substantial increase in state intervention in the econ- 
omy. After a constitutional reform, which enabled him to run for office for a 
second consecutive term, he  was reelected by  a landslide victory in  1952. 
That year the country experienced a balance of payment crisis, which forced 
a switch to an adjustment program that was sustained until the fall of Peron in 
1955. Political totalitarianism, curtailment of  the free press,  open conflict 
with the church and with some sectors of the military created a wide coalition 
that eventually supported the coup of  1955, which ousted Peron and sent him 
to exile. From then until 1973 the Peronist party was forbidden to participate 
in any electoral contest. 
The military called for elections in 1957, which led in 1958 to the election 
of  President Frondizi, who, though not belonging to the Perionist party had 
the explicit support from exile of Peron. Frondizi implemented strong popu- 
list measures (basically granting substantial wage increases) during his first 
year of government, afterward switching to a different strategy (El Desarrol- 
lismo) which gave paramount importance to free enterprise, saving, and capi- 
tal accumulation (see Mallon and Sourrouille 1975). 
Another coup, in  1962, ousted Frondizi and new elections were called for 
in  1963. The election took a radical, Arturo Illia, to the office of  the presi- 
dency. Illia won with 25% of the votes. Blank votes (which obviously corre- 
sponded to the proscribed Peronist party) totaled  19%. Three years later, in 
1966, the military once again stepped in. The new president, General On- 
gania, declared then that “the system of  pluralist democracy has been given 
its chance in Argentina and therefore something new  should be tried now” 
(Ferns 1971). 
This new military regime was completely discredited by  1972 and free elec- 
tions were called. For the first time Peronism would not be banned, though 
Peron himself was. Elections were held  11 March 1973. Hector Campora, the 
Peronist presidential candidate, obtained 49.6% of all of votes. Campora had 
promised to give a kickoff to the Peronist program before resigning and calling 
for new elections in which Peron himself would be allowed to run for office. 
It is not surprising then that one of the campaign slogans was, “Campora to 
government, Peron to power.” 
Campora was  sworn  in as president 25 May  1973 and  resigned  12 July 
1973. The presidency was  handed to Raul Lastiri (head of  the Chamber of 
Representatives). This designation was intended to prevent the head of  the 
Senate, who was the legal successor but associated to the Campora ideology, 
from being sworn in. 
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twenty-third of that month. Peron was a candidate,  with his wife Isabel run- 
ning  as vice president.  The election  resulted  in  a landslide victory  for Pe- 
ron.  He obtained 57.3% of all votes followed by  26.3%  for the formula of 
the Union Civica Radical (UCR). 
Peron was sworn in  12 October 1973 and held office until his death on  1 
July  1974. He represented the traditional constituency and policies of the Pe- 
ronist movement, which were strongly based on labor unions and gave prior- 
ity to state intervention, import substitution, and the redistribution of income. 
He always supported  a moderate  position,  avoiding the extremes (both  left 
and right) which had slowly, after so many years of proscription, made their 
way into the party. This orientation was the one he had already imposed on 
both Campora and Lastiri. 
Isabel Peron, on the other hand, favored the right-wing  groups (under the 
strong  influence of  her minister  of  social welfare,  Jose Lopez Rega).  The 
right-wing program had five main goals: (a)  moving toward market-oriented 
policies; (b) curtailing union power; (c) eliminating subversion and guerrilla 
activity; (d)  gaining the support of the military; and, finally, (e) eliminating 
left-wing intellectuals from the University (Di Tella 1983). 
The administration of Isabel Peron was therefore characterized by deep and 
violent  struggle  between  the different  groups and members  of the  Peronist 
party.  Ideological  differences,  which had remained  silent while Juan Peron 
was alive, became open and explicit during Isabel Peron’s presidency. At the 
same time, economic problems appeared with a strength never before seen in 
Argentina, which, added to the open political fight, doomed from the start the 
possibilities of the vice president.  Nevertheless it was still almost two years 
before the conflicts became so intense that the fall of the government finally 
took place, on 24 March 1976. Describing the economic evolution during this 
period is the purpose of the following pages. 
4.3  The Three Year Plan 
The Three Year Plan  (Poder Ejecutivo  1973) was an extensive document 
intended to summarize objectives, instruments, and policies of the administra- 
tion that took office in  1973. It is considered to represent the main lines of 
thought regarding economic policy held by the government or the people in 
the Peronist party at that moment. It is worth remembering that in 1973 there 
was  a universal  trend  toward  more  state intervention  in the  economy.  This 
trend was not unique to Latin America even though it was particularly forceful 
there, and it is clearly reflected in the Three Year Plan. 
Among  the objectives  considered  in  the  plan  was  that of  social justice, 
which was defined  as a fair distribution of  income with  special concern for 
eliminating extreme levels of poverty and unemployment. The plan endorsed 
(1) strong reactivation of the economy by means of developing specific indus- 
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differences between regions; (3) reorganization of the state, in order to fully 
realize its new activities as a guide for the economy as a whole, as a mecha- 
nism for income redistribution,  and as a producer of  goods and services; (4) 
economic independence, to be achieved by  a strict control of  capital flows, 
foreign investment,  and international  trade; and finally, (5) integration with 
Latin America. 
The Three Year Plan considered that output growth would be led by basic 
industries (oil refineries,  iron and steel) and state enterprises.  Popular con- 
sumption would be the basis for massive production and therefore of an in- 
crease in efficiency. Prioritized among economic groups were state and local 
entrepreneurs  (a reduction  in the importance of  foreign capital was also ex- 
pected).  Three basic  conditions justified the feasibility of  achieving higher 
growth rates. First, that the possibilities of growth had been jeopardized in the 
past by the action of special interest groups. Second, that political instability 
had  also undermined  the  achievable levels of  growth.  And  finally, that the 
present conditions  in domestic and international markets were extremely fa- 
vorable for the acceleration  of  the growth rate. The authors of  the plan as- 
sumed that the strength of the new government would overcome the two first 
problems and that external and internal situations would continue to look good 
at least in the medium term. The quantitative goals were a 7.5% annual in- 
crease in GNP and a 12% annual increase of investment. Furthermore, it pre- 
dicted a doubling of exports between 1973 and 1976. 
Possible constraints  were also taken into account. Among these the three 
considered  most important  were financial, energy, and external restrictions. 
These were to be overcome in the following way: the first through an increase 
in savings and tax collection, the second through a program of hydroelectric 
development,  and the third through an aggressive program of export promo- 
tion.  Nevertheless the main solution would be made through  “an important 
effort in the organization and mobilization of resources which was going to be 
possible due to the political will to use them in favor of the popular majorities” 
(Poder Ejecutivo 1973). 
The plan’s backbone consisted of three instruments. The first was to obtain 
a compromise between the main economic interest groups and the state. The 
second was to pass a legislative package with laws oriented to changing the 
structure  of  the economy, and the third  was to use direct economic  policy 
measures. Among the latter, for example, a nationalization of deposits (i.e., a 
100%  of reserve requirement), an improvement in the quality of planning, and 
a tax reform. The plan previewed a strong increase in wage and price controls. 
Public  enterprises  would  expand  progressively,  occupying  those  sectors  in 
which the market had already proven its failure and redistributing income by 
charging higher rates to big consumers. A special law of industrial promotion 
would aim to develop small and medium-size firms. 
For those measures concerning the external sector it is worthwhile to quote 
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Regarding  the  external  sector,  the  control  of  the  state  over  commercial 
transactions will be  increased and indirect mechanisms for obtaining equi- 
librium in the balance of payments will be avoided. Bilateral negotiations 
will be encouraged  (especially with Latin  America and Third World and 
Socialist countries). Traditional exports will be regulated by the Juntas Na- 
cionales de Carnes y de Granos in order to maximize benefits for the coun- 
try and to protect them from foreign interests.  Industrial exports will re- 
ceive fiscal incentives, easy credit and foreign exchange insurance. Imports 
will be planned regarding their level and characteristics meanwhile tariffs 
will protect national production, promote commerce and improve the allo- 
cation of resources. 
In addition to the general policies the plan considered complementary in- 
Such instruments would be principally the use of control enterprises [those 
in which the state is a producer in order to regulate a particular market] . . . 
production  quotas for durables  and  semidurables  [whose  purpose  is  to 
achieve a quicker  accommodation  of  supply to the changes in aggregate 
demand that will be produced as a consequence of income redistribution] 
. . . tariffs with a social and regional purpose [as an instrument of income 
redistribution]  . . . subsidies in different categories [promotion of certain 
regions or sectors, modification  of relative prices as compensation toward 
social  necessary  but  inefficient  firms] . . . import  and export quotas  [in 
order to rationalize the use of foreign exchange and to distribute the pro- 
duction  of  certain goods between  internal  demand  and the  international 
market]. 
The plan also contained a detailed description of all components of the na- 
tional  accounts, with  predictions  for all of them in the f~ture.~  It also con- 
tained  a wide variety of different  statements.  It explained,  for example, the 
need and advantages of increasing the consumption of fish, as well as arguing 
why the unemployment rate should be reduced from 6% to 2.5%. 
The state was conceived as the moving force of development: 
The state is conceived as a mechanism oriented by the political power who, 
in  interpreting the needs and objectives of national popular majorities, has 
to establish the basic rules and orientations of its own behavior. Several are 
the tasks which the state will have under the spirit of the Trienal Plan. First, 
it will have to regulate the economy; this will take place by means of an 
open agreement with the main political,  labor and business organizations, 
and  will  not have  any technocratic  or elitist connotations but  will derive 
from a clear understanding of the interests of the people. Second it will take 
struments of economic regulation. I quote here again from the plan: 
4. For example, exports were expected to increase by 92% between 1972 and  1977. Agricul- 
tural exports were supposed to grow by 81%, cattle sector exports by 50%. and industrial exports 
by 38 1%.  The service account was to improve by 30% due to an increase in insurance and freight 
made by Argentine ships and airline tickets sales. It is difficult to assess where these predictions 
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over the production of goods and services, not only those related to social 
needs and traditional economic infrastructure  but also those important in 
the process of development  and which are characterized by  having a big 
multiplier effect over all the economy and by being oriented by the concepts 
of sovereignty, national reconstruction and territorial integration. Third and 
final, the state will work on the important function of income redistribution, 
which will take place through social spending, wage increases and tax and 
credit policies to be implemented. 
In order to achieve all these goals, the plan proposed,  in addition to the 
basic agreement, several other instruments. Among these was the State Com- 
promise Act, in which the national and provincial governments would agree 
to make public administration more efficient. Also included were the National 
Institute of Public Administration, an institution with the objective of teaching 
people how to run the state more efficiently, and the creation of the Corpora- 
tion of  National Enterprises, which would coordinate the functioning of state- 
owned enterprises. 
As can be seen from the previous exposition, the plan was mainly voluntar- 
istic, with changes to be achieved by means of agreements between the parties 
to  improve things. It is difficult to determine whether the predictions it con- 
tained were anything more than numbers made up in order to fit consistently 
in the national accounts framework and to justify some of the basic objectives 
of the authors of the program. It is also hard to assess the final influence of the 
program on government policies.  The National Pact was a key factor in the 
stabilization program, but  the Corporation  of  National  Enterprises,  for ex- 
ample, never achieved anything of importance. 
The Three Year Plan was a medium- and long-run program that was basi- 
cally concerned with structural reforms. Many of these died out in Congress, 
and many of those that passed were never implemented. The program was in 
line with a common trend at that time-not  only in Latin America but in the 
whole world-of  increased intervention of the state in the economy, but it also 
fell  short of  socializing  completely  the economy.  It therefore gained many 
critics from both the left and the right, and it eventually was only supported 
by the moderate group surrounding Peron.  Later on it could be read, “With 
Peron  in the Pink House the probability that this development  plan  will be 
implemented is high. This signals the strength of the plan but also shows its 
dependency on a particular source of constant and solid political power, such 
as the one that can be provided by the President” (La  Opinidn, 26 December 
1973). 
4.4  Initial Conditions 
By June  1973 external and internal conditions for the Argentine economy 
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future.  On the  one hand, the  economy  was  experiencing  a period  of  high 
growth of GNP with growth rates in the two first quarters of 1973 of 6.1% and 
6.3%.*  The agricultural sector, which had done badly in 1972 (it finished with 
a drop of 7.9%), was experiencing a strong recovery due to high international 
prices and good weather conditions. (Agricultural output growth was  12.2% 
in the first quarter and 21.8% in the second.) The sector finished the year with 
a growth rate  of  13.5%, which was  not only  important in  itself but had a 
considerable  positive impact on the availability of foreign exchange for the 
economy. The industrial sector had experienced a growth rate of  6% during 
1972, increasing to 7.4% and 6.6% for the first two quarters of 1973. Invest- 
ment at 21.6% of GNP in  1972 was slightly above historic levels, rising to 
22.6% and 22.4% of GNP in the first two quarters of  1973. As much as in- 
vestment is an intertemporal decision, these figures indicate that the expecta- 
tions on the future evolution of the economy were optimistic. 
Unemployment was considered to be at its natural rate. In April 1973 it had 
been 6.1% in greater Buenos Aires. Inflation was the biggest problem and was 
extremely high if compared with that experienced in the postwar period. The 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) in  1972 showed an increase of 64.2%, which 
almost doubled  that experienced  in any previous  year  of Argentine history 
(except for the strong inflationary peak of  1958). The importance of this num- 
ber can be appreciated  by  repeating  what was said at the moment the  1972 
inflation rate was made public: 
The dramatic signification of the numbers reveals with absolute clarity that 
inflation is here a process apparently out of control. In the first place, it is 
by  now proved that a reduction in the means of payment has been useless 
in the containment of inflation. That means that even though an increase in 
monetary circulation can be one of the factors which feed the inflationary 
process, this is a phenomenon which evolves through other channels.  . . . 
Argentine  inflation recognizes other causes. . . . They must be contained 
in  the  structural  deficiencies  of  our economy.  . . . The vicious  circle  of 
inflation threatens to become the image of  frustration.  (Clurin, 5 January 
1973) 
The Wholesale Price Index (WPI) had also had strong increases in the first 
three months of 1973. This was in part the consequence of the anticipation of 
the price freeze. If firms forecast a freeze but know that no restrictions will be 
applied to any possibk rebates they may charge, then it is optimal for them to 
increase their price to the  level expected to prevail at the end of  the freeze 
while offering at the same time compensatory rebates. While nominal prices 
are fixed they can permanently adjust their real prices by changing the amount 
of  the rebate. As firms were anticipating a freeze with the new government, 
5. Growth rates considered in this paper arise from a comparison with the corresponding period 
of the previous year. 88  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
early in 1973 they tired to increase their relative price prior to its implemen- 
tation. (See table 4.1 and fig. 4.1. Data provided in the statistical appendix of 
Di Tella 1983 was used.) 
The fiscal deficit was high but not excessively so. Data from the Fundacion 
Mediterranea shows a deficit of  3.7% of  GNP in 1972. (Previous values had 
been 3.1% in 1971, 1.8% in 1970, and 0.9% in 1969.) It is true that the fiscal 
deficit was higher than that of the immediate previous years,  but it was per- 
fectly in line with the values observed in the 1950s and 1960s. Data from the 
Central Bank  (which considers the central government’s Treasury operations) 
Table 4.1  Monthly Inflation Rates: The CPI and WPI 
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos (INDEC). 
Note: CPI = Consumer Price Index, seasonal; WPI = Wholesale Price Index 89  Description of  a Populist Experience: Argentina 
Fig. 4.1  Monthly CPI increases, 1972-76 
shows in the first quarter of  1973 a positive but not very large increase in the 
deficit (see table 4.2). Money creation was not only positive but was increas- 
ingly so. In 1972, MI had increased by 44%. 
In conclusion, on the internal side the economy was experiencing a period 
of overheating induced by expansionary demand policies. At the moment the 
same impression was supported as one could read, "There are indications that 
the first quarter of 1973, which is half way through, keeps and even surpasses 
the evolution which the economy exhibited at the end of  1972. . . . In sum- 
mary  it is possible to forecast for this first quarter of  1973 a rising  level of 
economic activity. This could vary substantially in the second quarter but not 
enough to avoid making 1973 the tenth consecutive year of continued growth" 
(La  Nacidn, 18 February 1973). 
On the external front, multiple exchange rates were in place. There was an 
exchange rate for traditional exports, one for promoted exports, another for 
imports, and one for financial  transactions.  All of these had  been  strongly 
overvalued during the year, previous to May  1973. There was also a free par- 
allel market. In May, trading in the parallel market was being done with a 32% 
premium over the financial rate. (Part of this increase had been built up in the 
weeks before the change in government.) 
Export prices increased substantjally in the period immediately before the 90  Federico A.  Sturzenegger 
Table 4.2  Public-Sector Deficit 
























































Note: BCRA (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina): Central government's treasury opera- 
tions (as % of GNP); FundaciBn Mediterranea: Change in total public-sector indebtedness (as % 
of GNP). 
beginning of  the populist experience. This was the main cause in a substantial 
improvement of  the terms of trade for Argentina.  The export price  index, 
which had a value of  100 in both 1970 and 1971, jumped to 121 in  1972 and 
180 in  1973. The terms of trade, which had been around  100 in  1970 and 
1971, jumped to 117 in 1972 and remained at that level until the third quarter 
of  1973. In  1974 they dropped to around 70 and stabilized there (see table 
4.3). During the first half of 1973 the noninterest current account experienced 
a surplus of $400  million.  Foreign exchange reserves increased from $300 
million in the first quarter of 1972 to $900 million in the second quarter of 
1973. 
In summary, the situation in the external front in May 1973 was excellent: 
high international prices for Argentine exports plus abundant international re- 
serves in the Central Bank. 91  Description of  a Populist Experience: Argentina 
4.5  Initial Phase of the Stabilization Program 
On  25  May  1973, after being  sworn as President, Hector Campora ap- 
pointed Jose Ber Gelbard as minister of  finance. Gelbard was a businessman 
and director of one of the main business lobbying groups, the Confederacion 
General Econ6mica (CGE), which basically represented national capital. The 
extreme left-wing groups that surrounded President CBmpora accepted this 
designation because it had been an imposition of General Peron. 
Gelbard first attacked the most compelling problem of  the economy, the 
extreme rate of inflation. The stabilization package consisted, as stated in the 
Three Year Plan, of  an agreement among interest groups which was formal- 
ized in the Acta de Compromiso Nacional (National Compromise Act). This 
was in line with the inter-class cooperation approach usually put forward by 
the Peronist party but basically corresponded to the view that the inflationary 
process was a consequence of  an income struggle which the Act intended to 
Table 4.3  Terms of 'hade 





































































































Source: Fundacion de investigatihes economicas latinoamericanas (FIEL). 
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stop. The explicit target was an inflation rate of zero, an objective too ambi- 
tious and which was afterwards to be sustained for too long. 
Public tariffs were adjusted and prices of  all goods were frozen until  1 June 
1975.6  The freeze involved the reduction in nominal terms of some prices. 
Medicine,  clothes, and shoes prices,  for example, were decreased by  15%. 
The price of meat was reduced  13.5% compared to that prior to the freeze. 
Regarding this measure it could be read on 3 June 1973 (Lu  Nucidn),  that “the 
most spectacular measure was the fixing of a maximum price for meat. This 
was a measure previously imposed by other governments and always generat- 
ing wide resistance.  Everything indicates in this case that there is a general- 
ized will of cooperation among producers . . . In fact, these maximum prices 
generated a fall of approximately  15% in the price of cattle and even of 27% 
in some other minor categories.” 
Wages were raised by a fixed amount of $200. This had the double effect of 
increasing the real wage and of flattening the wage pyramid. Family subsidies 
were augmented by 40% and the minimum wage was raised to $1,000. After 
this,  wages were to remain fixed until  1 June  1975, with an adjustment for 
productivity  1 June  1974. (This two-year  freeze was a policy  copied from 
Per6n’s  1952  stabilization  program.)  The increase  in  real  wages  had  the 
double purpose of improving income distribution and of raising consumption 
demand, therefore reactivating the economy. 
The exchange rates were fixed at the levels recorded 25 May, and nominal 
interest rates were reduced.  Easy credit was issued, especially to finance the 
increase in wages. A 13% yearly nominal interest rate was set for these cred- 
its,  in  what  was  at most  a suspicious  policy  that was to become  almost a 
continuous practice in the subsequent years.’ This expansion in money supply 
was of no concern to the authorities, which regarded inflation not as a mone- 
tary phenomenon  but as related to structural characteristics of the economy 
such as income distribution and income struggle, which eventually generated 
a wage/price spiral. Concerning monetary policy it was stated that “the instru- 
ment of the fight against inflation in this popular government is not and cannot 
be exclusively monetary, said a top aide of the economic team.  . . . We begin 
by accepting that the inflationary process in Argentina is related  to a regres- 
sive income distribution,  and it is that regressivity that we are committed to 
eliminate, and for that we will use stability as an instrument and not as an end 
in itself” (La Opinidn, 15 August 1973). 
Several  important  laws  were  also  sent  to  and  approved  by  Congress. 
Among these were a law regulating agricultural exports, the “Buy Argentine 
Act” (which forced public firms to have Argentine suppliers), and a foreign 
investment law, to restrict the remission of  profits and the nationalization of 
6.  Petrol prices increased by 70%, natural gas by 30%. etc. 
7. Recall that the CPI inflation rate had been 5% in April  alone. It is true, nevertheless, that 
inflationary expectations are forward looking and, ex ante, the expected real interest rate may 
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bank deposits.  A tax reform, which  included a moratorium on formerly un- 
declared taxes, introduced profit, capital, wealth, and value-added taxes. The 
National Corporation of State Enterprises was created.  The state was given 
power to fix  maximum  prices.  Professional work was regulated through  the 
Ley de Asociaciones Profesionales . 
These reforms did not bear directly on the stabilization program but were 
part  of  the  government’s policy  that was not  only oriented  to stabilize the 
economy but designed to change it in a permanent and distinguishable way. 
Regarding income distribution,  the final objective was an equal distribution 
between labor and capital. 
The announcement of this stabilization program and the structural reforms 
just mentioned made clear that the government was implementing middle-of- 
the-road  policies,  which corresponded  to the traditional  thought  of General 
Perch. 
The program further alienated the extreme left, which considered it a sell- 
out to interest groups and consequently  increased  its level of  violence.  The 
businessmen,  on the other hand, felt relief  as they  were expecting a much 
more  radical  program.  The conflict  among  left-wing  intellectuals  appears 
clearly reflected in the following comment by M. Diamand, a strong supporter 
of the government: 
The economic measures contained in the social pact . . . constitute an im- 
portant step toward the peaceful revolution  announced by President Cam- 
pora. It is probable that many may be disappointed: a smaller than expected 
wage increase, followed by a rise in public sector tariffs and taxes and also 
accompanied by a suspension in wage negotiations which brings unpleasant 
memories.  Nevertheless the price freeze, the structure of tax reforms, the 
allocation of public investment to social ends and an expansive monetary 
policy give to this package a completely different content, making it a pow- 
erful agent of income redistribution and increase in the level of activity. (La 
Opinidn, 12 June 1973) 
The results of the program were impressive. The inflation rate was negative 
in June, with a decrease of 2.85% in the CPI and of  1.4% in the WPI. Inflation 
remained  extremely  low  afterward  for  almost  a  year.  During  the  first  12 
months of  the  plan,  inflation  was just 0.6% per  month,  and during the  17 
months in which JosC Ber Gelbard was Minister of  Finance it averaged only 
1.4% per month (see table 4.1 and fig. 4.1). 
Real wages increased, especially in July when they rose by 20.5% (see fig. 
4.2 and table 4.4). Unemployment decreased from 6.1% in April of  1973 to 
5.5% in July and 4.5% in October (De Pablo  1980a) (see fig. 4.3 and table 
43.8 
8. This trend continued in 1974 with unemployment rates of 4.2%,  3.4%,  and 2.5%  in April, 
July, and October, respectively. De Pablo (1980a) considers that half the unemployment reduction 
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Fig. 4.2  Real wages, 1973 = 100 
Output growth remained high: 5.8% in  1973 and 6.5% in  1974. The agri- 
cultural sector experienced the strongest increase, with a growth rate in 1973 
of  13.5%, which fell but nevertheless remained high during  1974, at 6.2%. 
The industrial sector showed a more stable pattern, with growth rates of 6.4% 
in 1973 and 6.1% in 1974 (see table 4.6). Consumption also began to boom. 
As De Pablo (1980a) points out, it increased 7% in the last half of  1973,7.3% 
in the last quarter of  1973 and  11% in  the first three months of  1974. Most 
strikingly,  the percentage  of income accruing to wage earners increased  by 
4.2% of  GNP in  1973 and  stabilized at this  new  level  in  1974. The wage 
increase implemented by the government had successfully achieved both an 
increase in consumption  and a progressive redistribution  of income. Already 
in September 1973, one could read: "Now  almost at the end of the third quar- 
ter,  the  industrial  sector  shows  consistent  indications  of  a  strong  recov- 
ery. . . . The majority of firms considers, now, that the notorious deceleration 
of prices produced by the stabilization program will keep the change in infla- 
tionary expectations generating such a shift in increased productive behavior" 
(La Opinion, 13 September 1973). 
Nominal money continued to expand. During 1973 the increase in the mon- 
etary aggregates doubled that of  1972. Nominal  interest rates decreased and 
real interest rates became negative. Disinflation was at the same time quickly 95  Description of a Populist Experience: Argentina 
Table 4.4  Real Wage" Index 





















































Year and Month  Wages 
1975  105.6 
January  118.6 
February  103.4 
March  111.0 
April  101.7 
May  97.2 
June  155.9 
July  114.3 
August  102.1 
September  92.2 
October  91.6 
November  99.  I 
December  86.6 
I976  63.3 
January  101.8 
February  85.3 
March  74.1 
April  60.9 
May  54.0 
June  60.3 
July  57.6 
August  54.0 
October  51.1 
November  54.7 
Decem ber  51.4 
September  54.7 
Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
aLJnskiIled  married worker, 1973= 100. 
monetizing the economy.  And MI as a percentage of GNP was 9.2% during 
the first half of  1973, rising to 12.2% in the last quarter and to 14.4% in the 
first quarter of  1974. This represented for the government a revenue of 5.2% 
of  GNP as seignorage  in  just  nine  months  (see table  4.7).  In  those  nine 
months, M2 increased by 9.5% of GNP. 
The external  sector was also improving  substantially.  Reserves began  to 
increase, from $700 million in the first quarter of 1973, to $1,400 in the fourth 
and to its peak of $2,000 in the second quarter of  1974 (see fig. 4.4, and table 
4.8 below).  The free market exchange rate appreciated and fell to par.  The 
noninterest  current  account experienced  a surplus of  $700 million  in  1973, 
a sizable  improvement  compared  to a deficit of  $218  million  in  1972. Ex- 
ports increased 68% to $3,266 million.  Imports being rationed  increased  by 
just 17%. 
The economic team supported  the idea that exports,  and especially tradi- 
tional exports, were not strongly responsive to prices. Therefore, a devalua- 96  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
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Table 4.5  Unemployment Rate" 
Period  Percentage 
1972: 
April  7.4 
October  5.8 
April  6.1 
October  4.5 
April  4.2 
October  2.5 
April  2.3 
October  2.7 
April  4.8 
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Table 4.6  Growth Rates of Output' (%) 
Year and Quarter  GNP  Agriculture  Industry  Construction  Investment 
1972  3.1  -7.9  6.0  4.9  5.2 
I  4.7  -4.3  8.9  12.9  -  .4 
I1  I .3  -  13.2  7.6  8.0  -  3.0 
Ill  I .5  -  3.7  5.2  I .6  -2.3 
IV  3.3  4.0  2.9  -  2.4  37.3 
1973  5.8  13.5  6.4  -5.1  -1.3 
I  6.1  12.2  7.4  -  3.5  .7 
I1  6.3  21.8  6.6  -  12.7  .5 
I11  4. I  12.1  4.6  -  10.2  -  14.8 
IV  6.6  7.3  7.0  6.8  9.8 
1974  6.5  6.2  6.1  12.2  3.9 
I  4.3  8.8  3.2  6.9  -  4.6 
I1  7.5  8.6  7.3  11.0  2.8 
111  7.3  6.9  6.5  15.3  7.5 
IV  6.8  -  .6  7.0  15.8  9.5 
1975  -  1.3  -  3.5  -2.8  -  9.6  -7.2 
I  3.3  -5.7  2.9  8.2  4.3 
I1  1.4  -5.9  I .4  -6.7  -  2.2 
111  -3.2  -3.6  -5.6  -11.3  -8.1 
IV  -  6.3  2.8  -8.9  -  26.3  -  20.2 
1976  -2.9  3.5  -4.5  -  14.  I  -6.2 
I  -4.4  7.9  -  6.7  -  26.7  -  16.9 
I1  -5.2  -.I  -  6.3  -  15.0  -  12.6 
111  -  1.7  .8  -2.9  -  10.7  .5 
IV  -  .2  5.9  -2.0  -  .3  5.4 
Source: Banco Central de la Rephblica Argentina (BCRA). 
"Growth from same quarter of previous year. 
Table 4.7  Liquidity Coefficients 
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tion of  the currency was not considered a useful way of improving the trade 
balance. 
It is surprising that without a devaluation and in spite of  strong growth in 
money supply and an expansion in domestic spending, both generated by an 
increase in the public-sector deficit and a strong increase in private consump- 
tion, the Central Bank was able to accumulate reserves for over a year. Several 
factors helped in achieving such a success. Among them the most important 
was the strong increase in the terms of  trade during both  1972 and  1973. In 
the fourth quarter of  1973 the terms of trade began  falling,  but imports re- 
mained strictly controlled. This positive external shock gave open room for a 
loosening of the foreign restriction (see table 4.3 above). 
4.6  Problems Begin to Appear 
By the end of 1973 the stabilization effort was haunted by different circum- 
stances: “The rigorous anti-inflationary policy of  the government faces at the 
9. The idea that traditional exports were unresponsive to prices was complemented with ideas 
about the contractionary  effects of  the devaluation that worked through the induced fall in real 
wages. Early work on this field had been done by Diaz Alejandro (1966) and Krugman and Taylor 
(1978). 99  Description of a Populist Experience: Argentina 
beginning of  1974 three main threats. The first comes from the rest of  the 
world and is expressed in the dramatic increase in prices of all the imported 
inputs needed by the country. The second enemy of stabilization policy is the 
wage increases pursued by  some unions. . . , The stabilization faces a third 
problem, which is the lack of confidence by  wide sectors about the sustain- 
ability of stability” (La Opinidn, 25 January 1974). 
Indeed, by December 1973 the program had been so successful that internal 
inflation was below  international levels and pressure for revaluation of  the 
currency began to arise.  This pressure was  generated by  firms with  fixed 
prices that were facing an ever higher price for their imported inputs. Two 
basic positions in the government were set forward, one supporting price flex- 
ibility and the other defending a revaluation of the currency. After approving 
an increase in the prices for those firms it considered were suffering from this 
problem, the government reversed its decision and revalued the currency for 
imports. This generated substantial losses (quasi-fiscal deficit) to the Central 
Bank, as it was paying exporters a higher exchange rate than the one it was 
charging to importers. 
During the first quarter of  1974, inflation remained low and was about 3% 
during the whole quarter for the CPI and about 1.2% for the WPI. Finally the 
government gave in to union pressures and decided to adjust wages before the 
scheduled date in June 1974. As can be seen in figure 4.2, wages had slowly 
deteriorated since June 1973. A new National Compromise Act was signed 27 
March 1974. It included an increase in wages of  13% from the first of  April 
(but only if that increment was not less than $240, in  which case it would 
equal $240). The minimum wage was raised by  30%. Easy credit at subsi- 
dized rates was issued to pay for these increases, and, in addition, nominal 
interests rates were reduced by 4 percentage points. 
Tariffs were  adjusted once  again  with  the  general  index  increasing by 
53.4%, but with considerable dispersion between enterprises. At  the begin- 
ning of  April some 121 firms were allowed to change their prices from those 
they had had the previous year. (Special attention was given to the cases of 
negative profits.) 
The decision to modify the adjustment scheme would prove a major cause 
in the subsequent collapse of the program. The agents realized that rules were 
really not that strict and that eventually the government was willing to give in. 
Unions intensified their pressures, firms became more aggressive, and confi- 
dence in  the program immediately disappeared. The government gave up in 
this way one of its most valuable assets, which was its commitment to its own 
rules.  Monetary  and  fiscal policies were also incompatible with  complete 
nominal price rigidity. The combination of  these with a fall in confidence and 
therefore demonetization made the situation explosive in the short run. 
During the second quarter of 1974 signs of problems began to appear more 
clearly. Among these, illegal price increases and black markets began to pro- 
liferate. This had already been recognized by Ber Gelbard. When signing the 100  Federico A. Sturzenegger 
new National Compromise Act, he said, “The CGT [Confederacion General 
del Trabajo] has announced its decision of constituting sectorial commissions 
in order to control the adherence to the price and supply policy and therefore 
contribute to avoiding speculation and abuse, but this should not end with the 
work of the CGT. Each and every one of the Argentines must be an agent that 
should look  after that policy, because the State, by itself or with its institu- 
tions, can’t take care of the pockets of 25 million fools that don’t do [this]” 
(La Nacion, 28 March 1974.) 
Other sources were also taking stock of the problem. M. Diamand had ar- 
gued before the signing of the new act that: 
From the result of the negotiations underway between the CGE [Confeder- 
acion  General Econ6micaI  and  the  CGT over  price  and  wage  policies 
[hangs] the solution to the most difficult obstacle to the economic policy of 
the government, I refer to the shortages seen in the industrial sector, which 
every day are more serious. 
Every day we can hear of  dozens of  stories.  Shortages  of paper bags 
doesn’t allow the provision of lime, sugar, etc. A TV factory stops due to 
lackof paint, . . . 
The complete freeze was very successful in the achievement of very dif- 
ficult objectives.  . . . Nevertheless,  industrial firms in many  cases could 
not compensate even variable costs. . . . In the present situation it is nec- 
essary  to change from an income policy  based on absolute  stability to a 
policy based on price and wage flexibility. (Lu  Opinidn, 15 March 1974) 
Gelbard later had to defend his own policy in this particular respect.  In a 
conference given at the CGT on 22 May, he said: “We do not fool anybody in 
this or any other respect: there are shortages, there is a certain black market 
and a certain amount of speculation. But we hurry to say that, as we get notice 
of those  responsible  for these distortions  we will  fall on them with  all the 
strength  of  law.  . . . We  think  that  these  saboteurs  of  the  process  are the 
agents of counterrevolution” (La  Opinidn, 27 May 1974). 
By 12 June, after knowing that the inflation of May was above 4% (both for 
CPI and WPI), the president himself decided to defend the economic policy 
of the government.  In a message to the country, President Peron said, “Only 
months after the acceptance of that key agreement for the country [an allusion 
to the new National Compromise Act], it seems that some of those that signed 
it are decided in not obeying the agreement and want to make everybody be- 
lieve the same way.  . . .  Those of us who have been for years in this job, know 
perfectly that about 80% or 90% of the things being said are invented by the 
professionals of the psychologic action” (De Pablo 1980, pp. 87-88). 
But  Peron  himself  was  not  making  things  easy.  Five  days  later  he  an- 
nounced the payment of a whole extra salary at the end of June.Io Of course 
10. Argentine labor legislation provides for the payment of an extra monthly wage each year, 
paid half at the end of June and half at the end of December. 101  Description of  a Populist Experience: Argentina 
this was to come from money creation, directly used by the government to pay 
the extra wages, or through easy credit to the private sector. 
On the  first of  July  a most  dramatic  event left the  country  shocked and 
stunned.  At  1:15  P.M., President Juan  Doming0 Peron  suddenly died. His 
wife, Maria Estela Martinez de Peron, was sworn in as president. With this, 
political  expectations  moved  further  against  the  government.  The situation 
that Isabel Peron received was just about to become unmanageable. 
The external  sector  was  deteriorating  very  quickly.  Terms  of  trade  had 
fallen from 120 in the second quarter of 1973  to 65 in the second of 1974. The 
official exchange rates had become increasingly overvalued and furthermore, 
fiscal and monetary policies had continued to be strongly expansionary.  Be- 
tween July  and October 1974, the Central Bank lost almost 25% of  its re- 
serves, and the noninterest current account surplus, which had been $704 mil- 
lion dollars in 1973, dropped to $127 million in 1974. But this number hides 
the real deterioration  that the external  sector was experiencing.  Indeed,  the 
economy had a surplus of $395 million in the first half of 1974 and a deficit of 
$268 million in the second. 
Real interest rates, which had been about -  10% in the first half dropped to 
around -  20% in the second half of  1974, owing to the increase in the infla- 
tion rate. 
It was by  now clear that the price freeze would be removed any moment: 
“The reorientation of the process,  to make it once again compatible with the 
social  agreement,  looks  toward  the  implementation  of  a  more  flexible 
scheme. . . . The most difficult problem is that of  eliminating the machinery 
of  black  markets and reduce to the legal level those prices which  increased 
above [those limits]” (La Opinidn, 22 June  1974). “Laws of  this nature [the 
law on supply to markets], saturated with fines and terrific corporal punish- 
ments, is another negative result of an economic policy which has proven its 
failure” (La  Prensa, 26 June 1974). 
This became an open conflict within the government after Gomez Morales 
(president of the Central Bank) publicly declared that the whole price policy 
was in crisis. The president was already also suggesting that something had to 
be done; on 18 September, she declared: “Only a very significant change in 
the conditions that made Gral. Peron implement this economic policy would 
eventually suggest the need to implement changes in  the road pursued”  (La 
Opinidn, 18 September 1974). 
One month later it seemed that those significant changes in the conditions 
had arrived. On 21 October, as the situation worsened, the president reached 
a compromise with other sectors of  the party and appointed Alfredo Gomez 
Morales, a  respected  traditional  economist  from Peron’s  first government, 
minister  of  finance.”  The economic  team  of JosC  Ber Gelbard had  slowly 
11. Gomez Morales had been president of the Central Bank since the presidency of Campora. 
Differences with Ber Gelbard resulted in his resignation shortly before Ber Gelbard left the office 
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wasted away. “The difficulties of the economic team in the present reality must 
have taken it to this epilogue, in which it decides to retire. It must not [have] 
been prepared to assume the responsibility of the necessary fundamental rec- 
tifying measures” (Antonio Trocolli in La Opinidn, 22 October  1974). “The 
economic program had arrived, under Minister Gelbard, at a situation of being 
completely worn out. Inflation  was threatening to come back. . . . The pre- 
vious team promoted the increase in public employees, reduced firms’ profits 
and  left  the  state  ‘to be”’  (Mariano Grondona in La  Opinion, 25  October 
1974). 
Gomez Morales was expected to bring more flexibility to the economic sys- 
tem and to make some adjustment in the increasingly disordered fiscal situa- 
tion. For the president this postponed a full implementation of the right-wing 
program until later. 
GBmez Morales once again gathered the main interest groups to agree on a 
new act. Signed 1 November 1974, it introduced a wage increase of  15% and 
an  increase  in  equal amount of  family  subsidies.  The minimum  wage  was 
raised to $1,600. Regarding price policy, Gomez Morales did not disappoint 
anybody and incorporated  a new set of rules into the act that allowed firms 
experiencing increases in cost to raise prices. As Gomez Morales himself ex- 
plained  later,  “The policy  that we followed to stop inflation  in  1973 was a 
’shock’ policy, prices  and  wages were frozen, but  it was not adopted with 
enough  flexibility.  That shouldn’t  have  lasted  more than  six months; after- 
ward, facing imported inflation, we should have flexibilized the price market. 
As we didn’t, a black market appeared for certain articles.  . . . What should 
be done first is to flexibilize the price system to eliminate the black market” 
(as quoted in La Opinidn, 12 November 1974). 
These changes were received by the business community with relief. “The 
increases that the Executive Power has just authorized are a first positive and 
realistic step toward the organization of a market better prepared for produc- 
tive activities” (Clarin, 11 November 1974). “The third stage begins with the 
return of the president of the Central Bank [Gomez Morales], now as minister 
of finance. In this final stage of  the year-little  more than 60 days-an  in- 
creased  realism  seems to be the main  characteristic,  and old and forgotten 
worries reappear such as the fiscal deficit, the every-day-bigger black market, 
[and]  the  rise  in  the  exchange rate,  which  the  now  relatively  contractive 
money supply seems to have stopped momentarily” (La  Nucidn, 29 December 
1974). 
In spite of the positive impression that Gomez Morales made in more ortho- 
dox circles, he did little to stop the increase in money supply and to reduce 
the fiscal deficit (see table 4.2). On the contrary,  the fiscal deficit seems to 
have risen in the last quarter of  1974 and first of  1975. Money growth was 
strongly positive  at the end of  1974. At  the beginning  of  1975 it declined 
substantially but remained high.  Once again he declared, “The basic outline 
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and not to excessive consumption, and to fiscal discipline to drastically reduce 
the fiscal deficit” (quoted in La Opinion,  15 January 1975). 
By  1 February  1975, prices of public enterprises were adjusted (the price 
of  petrol was increased by  45%, electricity by 26%, railroad fares by  50%, 
etc.). 
In February the CPI and WPI showed increases of 4.6% and 12.5%, respec- 
tively. As inflation accelerated real wages continued to decline, falling below 
the previous lower peak achieved before the November act. On 1 March 1975 
a new adjustment had to be made. This time it was part of the so-called Great 
National  Parity.  Among the  arrangements it  contained was  an  increase in 
wages of $400 for all categories, further flattening the wage pyramid. A wage 
structure with wages at $100, $150, $200, and $300 by  May  1973 was to be 
transformed at  this moment,  March  1975, to  the  following values:  $100, 
$100, $125 and $168; that is, a wage difference of 200% was being reduced 
to one of just  68% (Amaudo  1979). The minimum wage was increased to 
$2,000, an increase that “could not be shifted to prices.” 
Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the real wage during this period. The real 
wage increased substantially after the signing of each agreement, meanwhile, 
in between agreements, it experienced a steady decline. What is perhaps most 
interesting are the dynamics implicit in the figure. The adjustments are made 
more and more frequently as the program evolves, with the initial adjustment 
being larger and larger. As inflation accelerates the decline in real wages also 
accelerates, generating the need to shorten the length of  contracts and raise 
initial wages in order to compensate for the increased erosion. This was re- 
flected in increased pressure on the government by  labor unions to adjust the 
wages agreed on previously more often and by bigger amounts.’* 
At the end of February the black market exchange rate was trading with a 
100% premium over the financial rate. Therefore, on 1 March, the economic 
team decided to devalue all the exchanges rates. The effective exchange rate 
devaluation (i.e., that obtained after eliminating trade policy changes) varied 
substantially across products. For  export goods (and particularly for tradi- 
tional export  goods) the devaluation was  almost completely compensated. 
with effective exchange rates moving between 0.6% and 1.4%. For imports 
the devaluation ranged from 11.5% to 5 1.3%. The tourist rate was devalued 
by  36.6% (De Pablo 1980a). The devaluation tried to stop a rage of specula- 
tive imports that were being carried out in anticipation of  the devaluation. 
Gomez Morales, in a public communication, stated: “In contrast to what has 
been done in the past, this exchange reform doesn’t include any preventive 
devaluation, nor has fiscal purposes, i.e., [it] has not been done to improve 
12. This situation is analogous to that  of nominal price setting, which has been extensively 
studied in macro literature. The price setter fixes a price and changes it only after the real price 
drops below a certain threshold value. If inflation increases, the price setter adjusts to a higher real 
price and does so more frequently. These dynamics are the same as those shown in fig. 4.2  (Blan- 
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the resources of the government.  . . . Its purpose has been just economic” (La 
Opiniun, 4 March 1975). 
This contrasted  strongly with his own opinions some months before:I3 “I 
reject even to consider modifying the exchange rate. A devaluation is useless, 
it is the last measure I will resort to” (G6mez Morales, press conference,  22 
October 1974). 
In April, Gomez Morales prepared an alternative emergency program, pos- 
tulating the need for a contraction in demand basically through a reduction in 
the real wage.  This, it was assumed, would worsen income distribution but 
would enhance the possibilities of achieving stabilization and increasing in- 
vestment and efficiency. As he himself explained: “The fundamental problem 
is the lack of productivity of the society. . . . We have to stabilize an economy 
that has lost even a minimum of stability. It is not necessary to reach a stability 
of  zero, but we cannot have the inflation  that these first months are show- 
ing. . . . Without doubt, from May on, the freeze we have implemented will 
begin  to  show  its  effects”  (statements  made  on the  TV program  “Tiempo 
Nuevo ,” 22 April 1975). 
Even though  monetary  growth was almost cut in half  in the  first part of 
1975, economic policy  continued  to be expansionary  (M1 growth between 
October and March had been an average of 4.2% a month). The adjustment in 
public enterprise prices was being quickly eroded by inflation. Output growth 
slowed down substantially in the first two quarters of  1975 (quarterly GNP 
increased by 3.3% in the first quarter and 1.4% in the second). Nevertheless, 
unemployment continued to fall until April when it reached an all-time low of 
2.3%. Private investment began to fall in the second quarter. Inflation accel- 
erated, with the CPI increasing by 8.1% in March and 9.7% in April. 
As  inflation  accelerated,  real  balances  began  to fall.  As a percentage  of 
GNP, M1 fell by 3% between the first and second quarters of 1975. The accel- 
eration  of  the readjustments  in the  signing of the national  acts was both  a 
consequence and a cause of the increase in velocity. The fall in the terms of 
trade,  the  closing  of  the  European  market  for Argentine  beef  exports, the 
overheating  of  the economy  and the exchange rate,  which  continued  to be 
overvalued,  weakened  substantially  the  external  sector  situation.  Reserves 
were  virtually  disappearing, dropping  between  November  and  April  from 
$1,573 million to $754 million.  At this stage, a run on the Central Bank, as 
in Dornbusch (1  987) or Flood and Garber (1984) was clearly under way. 
The acceleration of inflation increased the fiscal deficit through the Olivera- 
Tanzi effect. The government therefore relied more heavily on money creation 
in order to  finance its disequilibrium.  Nevertheless,  in the second quarter it 
was the private sector that accounted for the greatest share of money creation. 
13. Of  course it would be unwise for a Central Banker to anticipate the market on his planned 
devaluations. Nevertheless, Gdmez Morales’s statements reflected a standard position  in the gov- 
ernment at that time regarding the usefulness of  a real devaluation in order to improve the external 
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Too little had been done too late: the economy could not avoid a drastic read- 
justment. The public-sector deficit had already jumped from 3.7% of GNP in 
1972 to 7.6% in 1973 and to 8.1% in  1974. During the first quarter of  1975 
the situation appeared to stop worsening but the deficit remained incompatible 
with stability of nominal variables (see table 4.2). 
4.7  The Readjustment 
On  2 June 1975, Celestino Rodrigo, of  the right-wing group of  the party, 
was sworn in as minister of finance. He remained in office for 50 days, during 
which time a major readjustment took place in  the economy. His economic 
measures would be thereafter remembered in popular memory as “El Rodri- 
gazo.” 
Rodrigo considered that  the  balance of  payments crisis was  the  conse- 
quence of  overvalued exchange rates and expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies. On 4 June he implemented a 100% devaluation of  the financial ex- 
change rate, of 80% for the tourist rate and of  160%  for the commercial rate. 
In order to reduce the fiscal deficit he increased the price of oil by  181%, of 
gas by  40%-60%,  electricity by  40%-50%,  transportation by  75%, and so 
on. Wage  negotiations were to be suspended. The government nevertheless 
allowed an increase of 65% in the minimum wage but left all other wages to 
be decided in collective bargaining between workers and firms.  I4 
On 9 June the president announced that increases above 38% in nominal 
wages would not be accepted; three days later she had to increase this upper 
bound to 45% and 17 days later to 80%. Isabel Perdn was feeling strong pres- 
sure from the unions, which were at this stage in open confrontation with the 
government. Strikes were proliferating everywhere and the discussion among 
union leaders was not if they should oppose the government but how far to go. 
During the month, wage negotiations became almost chaotic. On  18 June the 
construction union signed one of the first arrangements with a nominal wages 
increase of  45%,  two days later textile workers negotiated  an  increase of 
100% in  their  wages.  The  increases finally settled between  203%  for the 
workers of  leather and 78% for the (public) employees of  water, electricity, 
and gas. Inflation jumped from 3.9% in May to 21.3% in June and 34.9% in 
July for the CPI. The WPI raised from 5.2% to 42.5% and 32.2%. 
In an attempt to stop the price/wage spiral the government froze the prices 
of  30  products. On 30 June, Rodrigo addressed the country, explaining the 
evolution of the economic program: 
Also in prices we have advanced fundamentally a new  policy that means 
the correction of real prices that the economy was paying, which were stim- 
ulating a black market more and more damaging to the interests of the coun- 
14. It is worthwhile to remember that it was in June  1975 when the initial freeze was to end, 
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try. We  have defined a basket of basic food over which an efficient control 
will be imposed. . . . An important effort will be made to increase tax col- 
lection. . . . This wage policy is coherent with the economic plan imple- 
mented the first of June, and will allow [us] to avoid spectacular increases 
in the near future in the exchange rate and tariffs. . . . .It will avoid unem- 
ployment and will make more possible the solution of  the external sector 
problems. (LuNucidn, 1 July 1975) 
The real exchange rate recovered, and the external sector showed strong 
improvement in the third quarter. Nevertheless this seemed much more related 
to the recession than to the real devaluation; in the third quarter the agricul- 
tural-sector production experienced a decline of 3.6%. International reserves 
continued to decline, reaching a low of  $529 million in the third quarter of 
1975. At the values of the first half of  1975 this was not enough to pay for 
even two months of imports. 
By the end of the month the president had lost a great part of her credibility 
and political support, and the right-wing faction had to step back as more 
moderate groups, especially those associated with the labor unions, were re- 
gaining positions. On 5 July, a long solicituda was published by union leaders 
in the main newspapers of Buenos Aires, which clearly shows the position of 
the labor sector regarding the economic policy. This solicituda contained the 
following six basic points: 
1. Ratify the support of the organized labor movement to the president of the 
nation, Dona Maria Estela Martinez de Peron, and the unconditional de- 
fense of the Doctrina Justicialista, core of the National Movement. 
2.  Oblige firms to apply from the 1st of  June the Law  14250 of  Collective 
Bargaining, whose validity was accorded with the Minister of Labor, and 
therefore is of legal validity and of obligatory compliance. 
3.  Repudiate the discretionary use of power that is generating unprecedented 
confrontations in  our Movement, between its chief and her workers, as 
well as [repudiate] the idea embedded in the measures that try to dena- 
tionalize the economy, and worse than that, the national being; an eco- 
nomic policy that deteriorates the real wage and therefore is contradictory 
in facts with the Justiciulistu principles of  a progressive redistribution of 
income in favor of the people and the liberation of the country. 
4. Call for a general strike for 48 hours, from midnight of  Monday, 7 July 
1975, until midnight of Wednesday, 9 July, as support of what is explained 
in this resolution. 
5. Give to the Directive Commission of the CGT the task of organizing this 
measure in essential public services. 
6.  Declare the Confederated Central Comity of  the CGT in permanent ses- 
sion from today on. 
It is difficult to determine the exact evolution of the real wage during the 
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that  were obtained months  later.  Comparison  is especially difficult because 
those increases differed substantially across sectors. The wage increases ob- 
tained in the June negotiation generated an important increase in the real wage 
for that month. Nevertheless  the inflationary explosion eroded that increase 
very quickly (see table 4.4 and fig. 4.2).  The fall in real wages induced by the 
adjustment  is clearly  perceived  by  looking  at the  figures for the  following 
months. In September real wages fell to their lowest level since the beginning 
of the stabilization program. 
As a consequence of the adjustment in the public sector, the strong deval- 
uation, and the explosion of inflation, a strong recession ensued. In the third 
quarter total output was to fall at an annual rate of  3.2%. For  the industrial 
sector the decline was even larger: 5.6%.  Investment also began to decrease 
as firms were expecting hard times ahead. The third quarter showed an annu- 
alized decrease of  8.1% in total investment and of  11% in construction.  In 
October the unemployment rate showed its first increase in almost two years. 
The acceleration of inflation further deteriorated the fiscal deficit through 
the Tanzi-Olivera effect. The deficit increased in the third quarter by almost 3 
percentag  points.  Money  creation  almost  tripled  in  the  third  quarter,  and 
monetization continued to drop significantly, falling by more than 3% of GNP 
between the second and third quarters. 
A new devaluation (of about 8% for the commercial rate, 18%  for the finan- 
cial rate) was passed 16 July. On 20 July, Rodrigo’s resignation was accepted. 
4.8  TheEnd 
At this  stage the government  was strongly discredited and divided  in its 
own ranks. The climate of political violence had intensified, and the military 
were quietly waiting for the reputation of the president to decline to the level 
at which they could safely stage a coup to regain power. 
But the government of Isabel Peron still had eight months to go until on 24 
March  1976, she was finally arrested and removed from power. Still, three 
ministers  of  finance  were  given  the  responsibility  of  handling  the  delicate 
postadjustment situation and trying to make it last. 
The first of these was JosC Bonnani, a former minister of finance from Pe- 
ron’s first presidency, who had implemented the adjustment program of 1952. 
JosC  Bonnani had  an original  idea:  instead  of  gathering  the  main  interest 
groups to sign a new agreement, as had been common practice with the first 
two ministers,  he gave them the responsibility  of formulating  an economic 
program and raising it to the government for consideration.  In a declaration 
on 22 July he said: “To those effects the ministry of which I’m in charge aims 
to convene all the sectors which represent the community as soon as possible, 
in order to design in agreement an Emergency Plan that the actual situation 
imperatively requires .” 
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important those completed by  the CGT,  representing labor unions, and the 
CGE representing businessmen. 
The document of  the CGT included, among others, the following recom- 
mendations: to reconstitute the state’s productive capacity with an  efficient 
plan, to support the policy of workers’ participation in management, to freeze 
and control prices, to reestablish subsidies to basic foods, and to support wage 
indexation, the nationalization of  foreign trade, the reactivation of industrial 
promotion, special credit lines for private firms, and the creation of a National 
Council of Economic Emergency. 
The document of the CGE was clearly more moderate and included, among 
others, the following suggestions: authorize the price increases that firms had 
demanded, allow the increase in costs to be reflected in higher prices, normal- 
ize the wage problems derived from the chaotic negotiations of  the Rodrigo 
period,  increase in credits,  and pursue indexation of  the exchange rate for 
exports after an initial devaluation, reactivation of public investment, estab- 
lishment of a fiscal moratorium, and the creation of an Emergency Economic 
and Social Council. 
In the  meantime,  Bonnani put  forward a package of  measures,  among 
which were an increase of  wages of  160% retroactive to 1 June (which Rod- 
rig0 had not signed). An  increase in tariffs of between 60% and 80% and a 
20% increase in the exchange rates. 
The general outline of  the policy was clear: “The strategy of the Bonnani 
team  is to try to give the most importance to the execution of  measures of 
extreme urgency, . . . but [to] avoid [any] decision that may become an ob- 
stacle for the concertation.  In this  sense Dr.  Bonnani behaves  as  an  anti- 
Rodrigo. At the same time, several enquires are made to establish coincidence 
points. . . . It has been known that the objective of Dr. Bonnani is to write a 
document that may function as a draft for a National Economic Program in a 
multisectoral meeting to be called soon” (La Opinidn, 27 July 1975). 
But the urgency in the execution, or the quickness in the convocation to the 
different sectors,  may  have been induced by  the weak political support of 
the minister. No other measures were taken due to lack of time. Shortly after 
the publication of the “suggestions” and exactly 20 days after taking office, on 
11 August, Jose Bonnani’s resignation was accepted. 
The next round went to Antonio Cafiero, a respected Peronist leader who 
had  the confidence of  the unions. Cafiero faced two serious problems: ex- 
tremely high inflation, generated as a consequence of the drastic realignment 
in prices of previous months (inflation in July had been 34.9% for the CPI and 
32.2% for the WPI), and a substantial increase in the rate of  unemployment 
due to the recession.  l5 The unemployment problem was considered a serious 
15. De Pablo (1980a) quotes a survey in which the unemployment rate in greater Buenos Aires 
was about 6% in August. A consistent methodology produced twice a year by INDEC, shows an 
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one  by  the  government  and  was  as such understood  by  the  private  sector: 
“FIEL  [Fundacibn  de  investigationes  economicas  latinoamericanas] , in  a 
study on the Argentine economy in September 1975, that will be in print soon, 
emphasizes a fall in sales, production, employment, and predicts that it is not 
correct to expect that the government will remain insensible to the situation in 
this respect (basically the wage problem) or that it will assume responsibility 
of making the burden of price stabilization fall on the working class. To expect 
wage increases in the near future is basically correct” (La Nucibn, 5 October 
1975). 
In his first message, on 25 August, Cafiero gave the unemployment prob- 
lem paramount importance. Regarding inflation,  a gradualist strategy was to 
be implemented.  But monetary growth was not restrained; M1 increased at a 
monthly rate of 15.3% while Cafiero was Minister. 
In a public speech on 4 November, Cafiero said: 
The Argentines  must remember that in August of  this year we were con- 
fronted with the following situation: threat of massive unemployment in all 
sectors, a process of galloping inflation under way accompanied by acute 
illiquidity,  and a virtual  default on our external payments  due to lack of 
foreign exchange. 
Of  the three problems  not one has been  resolved  completely.  . . . Re- 
garding unemployment  . . . firms and even the public administration will 
be obliged to keep reducing,  by direct or indirect procedures,  the number 
of theiremployees. . . . 
In the first ten months of this year prices rose by 261%.  . . . This proves 
that  “inflationary  pressures”  still exist,  but  we have  promised  to reduce 
[them] gradually and we are indeed doing so. 
Even days later one could still read: 
What are the basic things that Dr. Cafiero considers priorities? To  begin a 
process of  growth, he points out that it is necessary to reverse recessive 
tendencies,  stop unemployment  and generate expectations of recovery in 
the external sector. . . . 
The head of  the Ministry of  Finance leaves aside two issues:  stopping 
inflation and achieving a redistribution of income. 
What makes Cafiero different from other ministers, especially from those 
who preceded him, is not the instruments he chooses to stop the crisis, but 
the “timing.”  Dr. Cafiero uses a “gradualist” approach.  (Daniel Muchnick 
in La Opinibn, 28 November 1975) 
Regarding the exchange rate, Cafiero implemented a crawling peg in order 
to avoid an erosion of the real depreciation achieved by Rodrigo.  An  agree- 
ment was signed with the IMF and the World Bank in an important shift of 
strategy regarding multilateral organizations.  International reserves began to 
recover, bouncing up to $680 million in the last quarter of  1975, and further 
to $725 million in the first of 1976. 
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initial realignment on  1 November, which granted an increase of $1,500 for 
all categories and increased the minimum wage to $4,800. Family subsidies 
and retirement wages were also increased. Of course real wages were eroded 
significantly in the following months. 
Tariffs were adjusted on 1 November (with an average increase of 25%) and 
were afterward to be indexed in an effort to protect fiscal revenues from infla- 
tionary erosion. Nevertheless the public-sector deficit deteriorated further in 
the fourth quarter. Data from the Central Bank puts the deficit at 16% of GNP 
for this period.  Data from the Fundaci6n Mediterrfinea puts it at  16.1% of 
GNP for the whole year, though it may well have been substantially higher for 
the last quarter (see table 4.2). The deficit was somewhat reduced in the first 
quarter of  1976 but at 12.9% of GNP remained too high to be compatible with 
a minimum of stability. Money growth continued unabated. During the whole 
year M1  had increased by  almost 200%. Monetization remained at the low 
levels of the Rodrigo period. 
Prices remained controlled. For basic wage goods, a maximum price was 
fixed. Twenty-four other important goods were also frozen, and prices of lead- 
ing firms were supervised and could only be changed with the approval of the 
secretary of commerce. Inflation decelerated somewhat until November, but 
remained stubbornly above 10%. After that it began showing a clear positive 
trend. The CPI increased 8.1% in November,  11.5% in December, 14.8% in 
January, and 19.3% in February (see table 4.1). 
In January the exchange rate  market  was  further liberalized. All  tourist 
transactions were shifted to a free market, and several goods were transferred 
from one exchange to another. These measures, in addition to the devaluations 
implemented through the crawling peg (between August and February they 
accumulated 71% for the financial rate), enhanced the trade balance, which 
went  into surplus in the first half  of  1976 (see Dornbusch  1986). This im- 
provement was also a consequence of  the strong recession the economy was 
undergoing. As a result, a deficit of $425 million in the second half of  1975 
gave way to a surplus of $290 million during the first part of 1976 (table 4.8). 
During the year, the GNP showed a strong contraction, which became ex- 
tremely acute in the last quarter. The GNP fell by  1.3% during 1975. Output 
growth had been 3.3%,  1.4%, -3.2%,  and  -6.3%  for the four quarters of 
the year.  Construction dropped by  11.3% and 26%  in the third and fourth 
quarters, respectively, while investment dropped by 8.1% and 20.2%. Unem- 
ployment also continued to worsen: from a 2.7% rate in October it jumped to 
4.8% in April of  1976. 
Overall,  1975 finished with a strong reversal in the income redistribution 
trend. Participation of wage earners in GNP fell by almost 2% (see table 4.9). 
By January, criticism of the economic policy began to surface again: “In the 
absence of  substantial changes in the political orientation, nothing makes it 
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'pdbable  4.8  Balance of 'lkade and International Reserves 
Trade Balance  International Reserves 
(By Six-Month Period)  (By Quarter) 
1972:  1972: 
1  --  126.1  I  300.3 
I1  -91.9  I1  321.5 
111  300.7 
IV  529.0 
1  393.0  I  694.8 
11  317.0  11  892.7 
111  1285.1 
IV  1412.4 
1  395.0  I  1582.9 
I1  -  268.0  I1  1972.3 
111  1629.6 
1V  1446.4 
I  -  874.0  I  1057.6 
11  -426.0  11  732.7 
Ill  529.5 
IV  678.0 
I  289.0  I  725.7 
11  361 .0  I1  1 114.2 
111  1266.2 
IV  1943.9 
1973:  1973: 
1974:  1974: 
1975:  1975: 
1976:  1976: 
Nore; Both series are in millions of  dollars 
Suur-c-es:  BCRA and INDEC. 
Table 4.9  Percentage of Income Accruing to Wage Earners 
Year  Percentage 
1950  49.7 
1965  40.6 
1966  43.8 
1967  45.5 
1968  44.9 
I969  44.6 
I970  45.8 
1971  46.6 
1972  42.7 
1973  46.9 
I974  46.7 
1975  44.8 
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year may change during 1976” (La  Nucion, 4 January  1976). And after Cafi- 
ero’s resignation: 
The administration of the tandem Cafiero-Di  Tella, that initially generated 
positive expectations in some sectors, finished without any of the problems 
being resolved. Their action seemed marked by a complete lack of mobility 
that limited them to some financial arrangements abroad of little result, late 
adjustments  regarding  wages,  a frustrated tax reform and  finally in what 
most was done, successive and [ever-larger] adjustments in the exchange 
rate. 
The image that  he provided  was,  summarizing,  that of  someone who 
thought  [he] knew how to “administer the crises” but finally just made it 
“survive.” (Clarin, 8 February 1976) 
In  January,  the president,  who had been on leave for a month and a half 
while Italo Luder held the presidency, tried to regain some of her power: the 
right-wing program was to be given a last chance. Mondelli was named min- 
ister of finance on 3 February 1976. 
The expectations of his administration are well described below: 
It is accepted that the real wage cannot be defended but through an increase 
in  the  total  product  of  the  economy,  which  now  is  stagnant  or declin- 
ing. . . . A realistic readjustment  of  tariffs, or the cost of public services 
and the price of energy products [must be expected]. The public adminis- 
tration  spending,  especially  those  on  employees  will  be  strictly  con- 
strained. . . . It is believed that with the help of the IMF and complemen- 
tary help, the situation in the external sector could be solved. (La  Nucidn, 
26 February  1976) 
Or, as Mondelli himself put it some years later: 
At the moment of my arrival there were very serious problems.  . . . Let’s 
give an example: Argentina, at that time, had a spectacular balance of pay- 
ments crisis.  . . . That balance of payments crisis had to be dealt [with] as 
one would handle such a crisis, not more, not less.  . . . There was no other 
remedy than repeating, perhaps not to such a great extent, the measures that 
Minister Rodrigo had taken.  It’s very easy to say that such a medicine is 
sour, but there is no other choice if one has to take it in order not to die. (as 
quoted in De Pablo 1980b) 
In the two remaining months real wages fell even though a nominal adjust- 
ment of  12%, which afterward became  20%, was granted.  Tariffs were in- 
creased: on oil by 77%, on some derivatives by 300%,  phone services 70%, 
transportation  150%, postal  services  loo%, and  so on. The exchange  rate 
market was partially unified in an official market, which unified the previous 
financial  and special financial exchange rates with a devaluation for both of 
them of  82% and  28%, respectively.  (Nevertheless,  part of  this devaluation 
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a new  arrangement was  signed with the  IMF.  In  March  the  CPI increased 
by 38%. 
The plan once again gained criticism from the labor unions: “To the judg- 
ment of the committee gathered in La Plata, the Mondelli Plan will only pro- 
voke a fall in the real wage, a fall in consumption,  a fall in investment, an 
increase in unemployment, shortages, and the disappearance of  the State as 
investor” (La Opinibn, 12 March 1976). 
But by this stage the government had no credibility and inflation was clearly 
accelerating.  By mid-March the political events took over, as everybody was 
expecting from one moment to the other the fall of the president. 
The coup finally took place on 24 March  1976. An even sadder period of 
Argentine history was about to begin. 
4.9  Conclusions 
As an experiment  in economic policy, the Argentine experience between 
1973 and  1976 has to be considered a failure. In the end all its initial objec- 
tives:  stability,  redistribution  of  income, growth,  investment  and  increased 
standard of living were not only not achieved, but seemed even more distant 
in 1976 than they were in 1973. 
During  1973 the heterodox approach to fighting inflation implemented by 
Gelbard was extremely successful; it shows that wage and price freezes can be 
a very useful (and perhaps unavoidable) mechanisms for achieving disinfla- 
tion without recession.  By coordinating expectations, a painful learning pro- 
cess can be avoided if  the government is able to convince the public that a 
new equilibrium has been achieved. In the case of Argentina, the stabilization 
program was strongly supported by the increase in the terms of trade, which 
avoided exchange rate problems until well into 1974. The strong increase in 
money demand gave the government an  extended span of time during which 
it could have tackled the fiscal deficit problem at the root of the inflationary 
process. Unfortunately,  this did not happen; on the contrary, the fiscal deficit 
increased during 1973, setting the economy on an unstable path toward higher 
inflation. 
If  the  basics  of  inflation  are  not  controlled,  the  heterodox  approach  is 
doomed to failure from the start because the expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies  finally  induce  wage  increases  and  price  pressures  that  generate, 
sooner or later, either shortages with a corresponding monetary overhang or 
black markets  and illegal wage rises.  Eventually the economy has to be re- 
adjusted, prices are freed, and the economy reverts to an equilibrium compat- 
ible with fiscal and monetary policies. 
The obvious question to ask is why, then, do governments follow such in- 
consistent policies? Given that failure seems to be guaranteed and that such 
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volume document),16 how  can one rationalize,  from the perspective  of  the 
policymaker, the implementation of these policies? 
The first hypothesis that comes to mind is that policymakers are irrational 
or  ignorant. Populist policymakers may not understand or know the basics of 
macroeconomic theory and therefore may engage in policies that prove to be 
unsustainable, a fact they would have realized ex ante had they known better. 
Even though this may seem plausible, it basically states that there is no expla- 
nation  for the emergence of populist  policies.  The basic problem  with this 
hypothesis is that it cannot explain either the pervasiveness of this phenomena 
in Latin America or the fact that no learning takes place even when similar 
experiences failed in the past. Furthermore, a government is a set of individ- 
uals who necessarily have personal objective functions that they try to maxi- 
mize. Recognition of this fact implies the need for explanations not based on 
the irrationality hypothesis. 
A more stylized  version  of  the irrationality  hypothesis  is that policymak- 
ers are ideologues whose behavior is constrained by the bounds imposed by 
their beliefs.  Even though  ideological  elements seem very important  in the 
claims and  announcements of  government  policies  (see section  4.3 above 
on the Three Year Plan), an understanding of the origins and of the social role 
of an ideology is necessary if any learning is to be obtained from this explana- 
tion. 
A third possibility  is that stabilizations are aborted because of  “bad luck.” 
When the government decides to undertake a stabilization program it balances 
benefits and costs. Costs are an increasing function of the outcome of a certain 
random variable (e.g., the costs of  sustaining  a fixed exchange rate system 
may increase with decreases in the terms of  trade).  The government decides 
to begin a stabilization program because it expects benefits will be larger than 
costs. For a range of realizations of  the random variable it may reverse its 
policy because the ex post costs exceed the benefits (Dornbusch 1988b). The 
problem with this approach is that it seems to work the other way around. The 
government never did a serious fiscal reform in the first year and a half when 
external and internal conditions were extremely favorable. On the other hand, 
it  seemed more committed to assume the costs of  adjustment  with  Rodrigo 
and afterward, that is, after a serious balance of payments crisis. 
A  fourth explanation is  that  governments  have  extremely high  discount 
rates. If  they think they may not be around when the stabilization program 
collapses, then policymakers may try to induce short-run gains even though 
they know the program is unsustainable in the long run. This interpretation is 
also not  convincing because usually  it is the  same government  that  imple- 
ments these policies and then suffers their consequences. This is not only true 
16. In some cases the costs are so high that they cast doubt on the existence of an explanation 
based on rational behavior. In the case of  Chile the populist experience led to the death of the 
president.  After 1976 the leaders of  the Argentine government eventually ended up in prison or 
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of  the Peronist  administration  discussed  in this paper,  but of  almost all the 
other experiences discussed in this volume. 
A fifth possible explanation  is the “interest groups” hypothesis. The gov- 
ernment  represents  a subset of  the  population  and  therefore  does not  care 
about the implications of its policy for other groups. This hypothesis includes 
several possible interpretations.  Corruption, for example, is the special case 
in which the subset of the population  represented by the government is the 
government  itself.  More generally  the policymakers may represent either a 
certain factor of production,  a particular region, or specific industries. This 
thesis  is appealing  for the  experience studied in this  paper  because all the 
national agreements  signed by the Peronist government included only entre- 
preneurs and industrial workers and basically consisted of transfers from the 
government to these two groups.  If the government cared only about them, 
then it may have been willing to incur the inflationary costs of its own policies 
as the necessary outcome of transferring real resources to those two groups. 
The problem with this hypothesis is that the policies implemented eventually 
harmed even these groups, an outcome documented in sections 4.6 and 4.7 
above. Nevertheless, this explanation must contain much of the truth. 
A sixth explanation relies on the nature of the political environment.  In a 
politically unstable society, and particularly where the policymaker’s horizon 
is subject to unanticipated changes, it is very difficult for the voter to assign 
responsibilities.  If  there is a principaVagent problem in the relation between 
voters and policymakers we know, from the theory of optimal contracts, that 
this  imperfect  monitoring  effect leads to a contract that relaxes the  agent’s 
incentives to run an efficient administration as compared to a situation where 
it is easier to observe directly his actions.  (For example, in Argentina it is 
usually believed that many policymakers or political parties would have never 
been reelected had they been allowed to complete their constitutional terms 
without being overthrown by the military.) This explanation has the implau- 
sible characteristic that, in reality the consequences of an economic policy are 
clearly observable, but has the advantage of explaining why almost every gov- 
ernment, independent  of its ideological position,  has been unable to reduce 
the fiscal deficit in a sustainable way in recent Argentine history. The same 
argument works for many other Latin American countries, particularly those 
in which populism has been recurrent. 
Another related explanation that also captures the fact that no government 
has been  able to reduce the fiscal deficit in a sustainable way relies on the 
nature of the budgetary process in Argentina (this being true for many other 
Latin  American  countries  as well).  The fact that spending and taxing deci- 
sions are taken arbitrarily by the executive power (when Congress approves 
the budget it usually does so months after the beginning of the economic pe- 
riod) weakens  the position of the government  in its relations with different 
economic interest groups. Instead of deciding fiscal policy in a single process 
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has to bargain individually  and separately with each one. This decision pro- 
cess generates a  bias  toward  deficits and inflation  because  when  a certain 
group deals with the government part of the costs of transferring resources to 
this group will be borne by the other sectors. This externality, which is inter- 
nalized by  everybody, induces a pattern of transfers far greater than the one 
that  would  result  from a  simultaneous  bargaining  process.  If  on  top of  the 
sequentiality of the spending process one adds the weak position of the gov- 
ernment generated by the unstable political process, the bias toward deficits is 
strongly enhanced. 
Finally, Alesina and Drazen (1990) suggest that stabilization may not take 
place  or  may  not  be  fully  implemented  because  conflict  between  interest 
groups may paralyze  the government. Finally one group dominates and im- 
poses the costs of  stabilization  on the other. This explanation looks particu- 
larly attractive in order to analyze the period after Rodrigo and to understand 
why a strong fiscal adjustment was only possible after the 1976 coup. It never- 
theless leaves unanswered the question of why the government engaged itself 
in  an unstable  process when  initially  it commanded  overwhelming  support 
and power derived from the electoral outcomes of 1973. 
The previous explanations are just partial solutions to the difficult question 
of  understanding why  the government engages in unsustainable  policies.  A 
complete theory of this phenomena is yet to be found. 
The price freeze was a basic instrument in the stabilization program. What 
sometimes has been  overlooked  is that it generates optimal responses  from 
price setters in the economy.  If  a price freeze is anticipated, there is an in- 
crease in the rate of inflation in the months before its implementation;  firms 
prepare a price cushion, which they can optimally use by  proper adjustment 
of  rebates while the freeze lasts. This explains why, in the months before the 
change in government, there was a substantial  increase in the price level. If 
the freeze is not anticipated  or lasts more than initially expected, then either 
black markets develop in which commodities are sold above the official prices 
or, if the price freeze is strictly enforced, shortages and a monetary overhang 
will begin building up. In both cases an adjustment of official nominal prices 
takes place when the policy  is finally abandoned. This may  also have hap- 
pened and might explain why the adjustment that Rodrigo implemented gen- 
erated such a strong outburst of  inflation. The Peronist government set itself 
too high standards. Trying to achieve a zero inflation rate, it attached itself for 
too long to a strict  freeze  that, soon  after  its implementation,  was already 
generating strong distortions, shortages, and black markets. 
The experience also shows what happens when the authorities consciously 
or unconsciously  forget the need to sustain external balance.  As soon as the 
exceptional price  situation of  1973 began to reverse,  the economy immedi- 
ately fell  into a deep balance  of  payments  crisis.  This made an adjustment 
unavoidable and generated a strong decline in the real wage, therefore leading 
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In the introduction  I remarked  that the possibility of expansion was basi- 
cally justified with old-fashioned Keynesian ideas. I also showed that the idea 
of increasing  returns  to scale, multiple  equilibria, coordination  failure, and 
externalities in general were also consistent with this idea. Both the Argentine 
experience and  other populist  regimes discussed  in this  volume  show that 
these contentions are dubious. It was not possible to sustain the equilibrium 
with high levels of activity, which generated in the end a balance of  payments 
crisis and increasing inflation. 
Recent  contributions by  Dornbusch  (1988a)  and  Sturzenegger (1990), 
study the relations between populist policies and real wages in a general equi- 
librium context. According to Dornbusch, the increase in real wages, by re- 
ducing the profitability of capital, initially generates a process of capital de- 
cumulation  (this  fact  is  not  supported  by  the  data  for  1973).  This 
decumulation makes the adjustment  even more difficult because  real wages 
have to fall below their initial level in order to make sufficiently profitable the 
levels of  investment that will allow the stock of  lost capital to reaccumulate. 
Dornbusch and Edwards (1989) consider this to be one of  the main mecha- 
nisms that explains why, when the readjustment  takes place, real wages fall 
below their initial level. Sturzenegger bases his explanation of the fall in real 
wages on the real depreciation that endogenously takes place with the read- 
justment of  the economy. In the case of Argentina, this can clearly be seen in 
table 4.2. Real wages eventually declined in 1976 to half the value they had at 
the beginning of the program.” 
Unfortunately, the strong procyclical  spending policy  implemented by the 
government eventually  required  a substantial  readjustment  of  the economy, 
which contributed to the discredit and fall of the president and led to a dicta- 
torship that lowered real wages even further. In addition to the capital flight 
and the fall in real wages (Dornbusch and Reynoso 1989) that accompanies 
the readjustment process, the military  substantially  weakens the bargaining 
power of  unions. Finally  the working  class is made much worse off  than it 
would  have  been  had  more moderate and sustainable  policies  been  imple- 
mented. 
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Comment  Guido Di Tella 
Until not so long ago it was not easy to explain the pervasiveness of  populist 
policies in Latin America. Sturzenegger finds unsatisfactory  six common in- 
terpretations,  ranging  from those that assume irrationality to others that as- 
sume optimal behavior of  the various actors. 
However, if not irrationality, at least ignorance of  basic economic criteria is 
a necessary ingredient of any valid explanation. A case in point is the alleged 
irrelevance of the fiscal deficit, justified quite wrongly on pseudo-Keynesian 
arguments. Another more complex case has been  the role attributed  to the 
state which, at least until the 1960s, was believed to exemplify a benevolent 
and visible hand that allowed the attainment of public good in a better and 
quicker way than the market. This, in the real Latin American world of  the 
last three decades, has proven to be erroneous. Whether it was inherent or  just 
a special case is beside the point, but it is clear that this belief is behind the 
quick adoption of quantitative  and price controls instead of (and not in addi- 
tion to) serious fiscal policies. 
If  one wants to go behind  the reasons  for those attitudes and “mistakes,” 
one can see that the desire to postpone harsh measures was a common denom- 
inator. 
Populism, as defined in this discussion, is dead in Latin America; a more 
subtle survival can be detected in the heterodox-orthodox  stabilization debate. 
Despite the efforts of serious heterodox economists to explain their policies, 
which should be taken over and above fiscal measures, they were interpreted 
as if they could be taken instead of the fiscal ones, repeating-mutatis  mutan- 
dis-the  populist propositions of the previous decades. No doubt, many het- 
erodox stabilizers are cousins to yesterday’s populists. 
If one should ask, as Sturzenegger does, What are the strong reasons behind 
the prevalence of populist policies which have been so predominant in Latin 
America? one has to go back to two basic causes, economic and social. The 
first is that Argentina, as many  other Latin  American  countries, started  its 
development based  on staples. Argentina, and most of  the other countries, 
showed at a later stage the Dutch-disease kind of syndrome, particularly the 
post-boom sort of problems. When the bounty of nature has to be replaced by 
the bounty of  human diligence, when new nonresource based activities have 
to be found, it is not unlikely that their productivity will be no match to those 
of  the resource-related activities of  the previous stage. 
At this juncture, it is not uncommon to see protectionism and state interven- 
tion appear so as to create quasi rents as high as the previous rents.  What is 
strange in the case of  Argentina is the extent, intensity, and length of  time of 
the protective  policies characteristic of the post-boom  stage. But one has to 
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accept  that  the post-boom redress  will  not  be  an  easy  one,  as  all  Dutch- 
diseased economies know well. 
The other cause for the populist pervasiveness of  times past, is indeed the 
revulsion  against  extremely unfair distributive  patterns and the existence of 
large sectors below the poverty level. “Direct action” seemed to be the only 
answer, while confidence on a market “solution” seemed excessively remote 
and diffuse and because of that, even irrelevant and immoral. But it is obvious 
that we must add, to these two main causes, an extraordinary degree of  igno- 
rance and naivete about the ways in which these problems had to be tackled. 
Inevitably, we have to go back to the view that ignorance is one of  the more 
deeply seated roots of this very counterproductive course. 
But fortunately a learning process has taken place, as can be seen in  the 
new turn imposed by the popularly based governments of  Menem in Argen- 
tina, Collor de Mello in Brazil, Aylwin in Chile, and Paz Zamora in Bolivia. 
They are supported by the same social sectors as the “populists” of previous 
times; and although they  have basically  the same social “Weltanschauung,” 
their policies are very different. 
We have learned the hard way, and we know the appropriate means, even if 
we are still stuck with the same problems. But new knowledge and new atti- 
tudes mean that the future, populist or not, will fortunately not be the same. 